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Abstract: This paper restates the thesis of The Requirements of Justice and Liberal Socialism 
where it was argued that liberal socialism best meets Rawlsian requirements of justice. The 
recent responses to this paper by Jan Narveson, Jeppe von Platz, and Alan Thomas merit 
examination and comment. This paper shows that if Rawlsian justice is to be met, then non-
personal property must be subject to public control. If just outcomes merit the public control of 
non-personal property and this control is not utilized, then justice has been subordinated to the 




This paper is my response to the articles that Jan Narveson (2017), Jeppe von Platz (2017), and 
Alan Thomas (2017) wrote considering The Requirements of Justice and Liberal Socialism (Holt 
2017). I will discuss their articles individually. Before I begin I would like to thank them for 
their insightful, interesting, and sincere comments they wrote in response to my work. I greatly 
appreciate the time and effort they have put into the task. Additionally, I hope they find my 
responses to be useful in developing further debate on these topics.1  
  
Jan Narveson 
Narveson’s article considers the reasonableness of egalitarian political philosophy that was 
endorse by John Rawls and by me in my article. He brings up many interesting ideas and 
                                                          




criticisms of this position. Unfortunately, I will only be able to respond to one, but one which I 
think is at the heart of his criticisms. Narveson finds that Rawls’ conceptions of fairness and 
redistribution are undesirable when compared with a conception of fairness that is based on 
acquisition without the redistribution of property. Specifically, Narveson disagrees that the 
redistribution of “some people’s fairly acquired property is fair” (Narveson 2017, 402). In 
considering which conception of fairness is the most desirable it is best to revisit Rawls 
definition of fairness that he provides in A Theory of Justice: 
 
“Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his 
particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. 
… The original position is, one might say, the appropriate initial status quo, and thus the 
fundamental agreements reached in it are fair.” (Rawls 1999, 11) 
 
Since people have no idea what they wish or what is to their advantage, behind the veil of 
ignorance, they must craft principles that people in the original position would agree to.  
There are two issues in considering fairness for Rawls. First, the original position is 
defined by Rawls as fair due to the absence of threat advantage. This is supposed to be a 
situation of moral supremacy compared to our everyday judgements as historical individuals. 
Thus, our conclusions that are made behind the veil should take precedence over judgments 
made outside the veil (Rawls 1999, §4 and §78; Rawls 2001, 17 and 102-103). Second, a fair 
decision making situation allows us to provide an objective hierarchy of goods. The ownership 
of non-personal property is considered to be of less importance than the enjoyment of our two 
moral powers, other primary goods, natural goods, and the use of personal property to facilitate 
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the enjoyment of these goods.2 This means that it is fair to redistribute non-personal property for 
goods that we find objectively more important (Rawls 1999, §26; Rawls 2001, 99).  
Rawls’ argument about why redistribution of fairly acquired property is fair is because 
there are more objectively important goods than the ownership and enjoyment of non-personal 
property. Without this distinction Rawls found that we are left with a collection of common 
sense precepts of justice that cannot be reconciled. What is needed is a “higher criterion” that 
will allow for these precepts to be ordered. Rawls’ discussion notes that Mill thought the 
principle of utility could serve such a role; whereas, Rawls states that the two principles serve 
this purpose in his own theory (Rawls 1999, 268).  
This higher criterion of the two principles can order these precepts that are in conflict in 
its absence: it is fair to own fairly acquired property and it is fair to redistribute to provide people 
with the goods noted above. Thus, Narveson’s criticism of redistribution needs to be structured 
with a higher criterion that puts the ownership and enjoyment of non-personal property as more 
objectively important than the enjoyment of our two moral powers, other primary goods, natural 
goods, and their facilitation by personal property. Such a conclusion, Rawls held, could not be 
made behind the veil of ignorance because under these conditions people would find the 
enjoyment of these goods to be more important than ownership of non-personal property. 
Guaranteeing people’s enjoyment of these goods and personal property is understood as the 
reasonable solution given no knowledge of ourselves, the conditions of our society, and world 
we will live in.  
  Rawls thought that competitors to the two principals have two serial avenues to 
challenge the two principles. First, they can argue that their conception of justice will be chosen 
                                                          
2 On what personal property may include, in contradistinction to the means of production, see Holt 2017, 183. 
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behind the veil instead of the two principles. If this fails, then competitors can “object to the 
setup of the original positon itself as a device of representation” (Rawls 2001, 83). Narveson’s 
notion of fairness would be rejected in the original position. Objecting to the setup of the original 
position requires a weakening of the limitations on knowledge. This results, at worst, in the loss 
of objectivity that the veil of ignorance provides, and, at best, a move towards the principle of 
average utility (Rawls 1999, §27). Both of these results do not get where Narveson wants to be: 
the consideration that the ownership of fairly acquired property is more important that other 
goods.  
 
Jeppe von Platz 
Jeppe von Platz provides several criticisms of my article that I will address individually. First, 
von Platz finds that he is not sure how workplace democracy as a basic political right “could be 
constructed from Rawls’s writings” (von Platz 2017, 409). One cannot exclude democratic 
political participation from the basic structure. If the economic is part of the basic structure, then 
people should have democratic control over the economy in two ways: nationally and at the level 
of the firm. Nationally economic democracy would allow for the overall regulation, planning, 
and ownership of all private property and social property. This would include all resources in a 
nation (that are not personal property) and all the means of production. This level of national 
economic democracy would allow for not only the control over quantity, price, and pace of 
output, but also the location and composition of total output. This would be needed for our 
enjoyment of our social primary goods and our natural goods (Rawls 1999, 54).  
Workplace democracy would be additionally required to provide for the protection of 
natural and social primary goods. The primary goods of self-respect and liberty would appear to 
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be more in jeopardy at the level of the firm than the national economy (within a constitutional 
democracy). Workplace democracy would be a means for people’s participation in the overall 
orchestration of the firm and a means for them to voice their grievances concerning the 
enjoyment of these two primary goods. Additionally, workplace democracy is a means for 
people to participate in the social union of their occupation in a reciprocal manner. Reciprocity, 
as the fair terms of cooperation, appears to require democratic control and participation (Rawls 
2001, 6).   
 Second, von Platz finds that democratic oversight of the economy does not require public 
ownership of the means of production (von Platz 2017, 410). Democratic oversight of the 
economy does not have to include the explicit and voiced public ownership of the means of 
production. Nonetheless, democratic oversight allows for regulation, redistribution, and 
nationalization of the means of production in order for justice to be met. There is no right to 
private or social ownership of the means of production according to Rawls (Rawls 2001, 114). 
This means that the owners of property can be changed to meet the demands of justice. This is 
different than our exclusive use of personal property. A person’s personal property can be 
regulated, but not in any way to meet the demands of justice.  
 Third, von Platz shows that even though families are part of the basic structure we should 
allow families to “determine their decision-making processes for themselves, and to leave the 
reproductive choices of families outside the realm of public regulation” (von Platz 2017, 410). 
Von Platz is correct about the limits that the public can impose upon the family, as Rawls 
discussed (Rawls 2001, 165). Von Platz then extends his argument to individual workplaces and 
private property. Just as a family can regulate its own affairs, an individual firm or person may 
do so over their private property. It is true that individual families can decide on what is the best 
6 
 
way for their families to be organized within the boundaries of justice. What also lies within the 
boundaries of justice is the possibility to change the rules and goals of governance, such as the 
capacity to alter our laws and change our leaders. Thus, a family can decide that its current 
system of decision making and its reproductive plans can be altered. When people get married, 
as Mill pointed out, they do not give up their right to self-rulership (Mill 1997, 32).  
Applying this consideration to the workplace or the economy as a whole I think is 
consistent. When we join a firm we should not be giving up our right to self-rulership. Thus, we 
should have the ability to alter how decision are made in our firms. This does not mean, contrary 
to Taylor’s reading of Rawlsian liberal socialism, a firm must have all of its members always 
participate in management (Taylor 2014). A family could decide that a particular adult in their 
household makes all the decisions, and then they could change their minds and choose a different 
adult, a committee of them, etc., to make decisions. The same notion applies to a firm. It could 
be originally set up where the founder-inventor makes all the decisions. This does not always 
have to be the case. The members of the firm may find that it would be better run if a 
professional management team was recruited and the founder was left to her inventions.   
 Fourth, von Platz argues that there is a dilemma between a regulated economy, which is 
endorsed by Rawls, and an economy that requires liberal socialism, which is not solely endorsed 
by Rawls (von Platz 2017, 410-411). As I showed in my paper, Rawlsian justice requires that 
public ownership of the means of production has to be available to a nation if this allows the 
requirements of justice to be met (Holt 2017, 192-193). If justice can only be met by explicit 
control of some or all of the means of production by public employees and/or publically elected 
bodies, then this means that liberal socialism best meets the requirements of justice. This is the 
case because a liberal socialist society always retains at least nominal ownership of the means of 
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production. All other kinds of ownership regimes that prevent public ownership and direct 
control will place the requirements of justice as secondary. Rawls’ neutrality between property-
owning democracy and liberal socialism cannot be maintained if the requirements of justice take 
precedence over who owns property.  
 
Alan Thomas 
There is one essential point that needs to be responded to at the end of Alan Thomas’ article. He 
states: “So I am not convinced that Holt has demonstrated that LS [liberal socialism] is the only 
way to express the value of justice as fair reciprocity” (Thomas 2017, 415). As noted above in 
my response to von Platz, reciprocity, as the fair terms of cooperation, appears to require 
democratic control and participation (Rawls 2001, 6-7 and 49). At the level of the firm this 
would either be workplace democracy in either a property-owning democratic regime or a liberal 
socialist regime. At the level of the national economy reciprocity would require that non-
personal property be subject to public control. This democratic control allows for the 
nationalization of a firm, industry, resource, built asset, or intangible asset. Reciprocity may fall 
short if any non-personal property item cannot be converted from private property into social 
property. Only a liberal socialist regime has these qualities of control over property. If a nation 
has the ability to change the ownership of property, even if the ability is not voiced, then this 
regime is a liberal socialist regime. An example I think will be helpful. 
  A given industry or sector may better meet the standards of fair cooperation if it is 
nationalized. There may be numerous problems associated with this industry or sector that could 
be alleviated if it were subject to national public control. Transportation systems, energy, mining, 
banking-finance, telecommunications, water, housing development, and urban planning are some 
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sectors where coordination failures, adding-up problems, negative externalities, and predation 
can be commonplace. These issues are failures of reciprocity due to the impossibility of fair 
cooperation when an industry or sector is operated as a decentralized aggregation of private firms 
or as private monopolies. With private business the rational interests of firm members take 
precedence over the demands of reasonable interactions of the members and non-members of 
firms as citizens. Explicit public control over these industries and sectors may allow for the 
alleviation of these problems. If they do so, then nationalization would be in order to meet the 
demands of justice.   
There is no reason why the public control of all non-personal property cannot include 
nominal private ownership for any period of time. This is why I stated that public ownership 
does not have to be always voiced (Holt 2017, 192). The demands of justice require that non-
personal property can be subject to public ownership. This capacity for the conversion of non-
personal property into social property to meet the demands of justice appears to be solely within 
the domain of liberal socialism. This means that reciprocity is best expressed in a liberal socialist 
regime. If private property cannot be subject to public control and the use of private property 
results in outcomes that are detrimental to reciprocity, then this society falls short of the demands 
of justice. If property-owning democracy does not allow for private property to be nationalized 
to allow for reciprocity to obtain, then property-owning democracy falls short of the demands of 
justice. If property-owning democracy does allow for the nationalization of private property for 
the enjoyment of reciprocity, then this economic regime is actually liberal socialism. The 
distinctions between property-owning democracy and liberal socialism cannot be maintained if 
the demands of justice require the public ownership of property. Once justice requires that the 
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economy is secondary to what is determined in a fair decision making situation, then the right to 
private property cannot be considered as basic, unlike personal property (Rawls 2001, 113-114).    
 
Final Comments 
Again I would like to thank Jan Narveson, Jeppe von Platz, and Alan Thomas for their 
interesting and thoughtful articles. It has been a great joy to provide responses to their engaging 
ideas. I hope they find my comments to be fruitful, and I hope readers found our exchanges to be 
of use for their own thinking on these topics. In closing, I have a few final comments. 
 The control over non-personal property is still an essential question of our age, since the 
inequalities of ownership impact our enjoyment of opportunities, reciprocity, and liberties. It 
appears to be impossible to live in a society that we would considered to be freely chosen 
without the possibility of public control over non-personal property. Rawls’ comments on the 
fundamental question of political philosophy for democratic constitutional regimes is important 
in this context:  
 
“That question is: what is the most acceptable political conception of justice for 
specifying the fair terms of cooperation between citizens regarded as free and equal and 
as both reasonable and rational, and (we add) as normal and fully cooperating members 
of society over a complete life, from one generation to the next?” (Rawls 2001, 7-8) 
 
I have argued that the fair terms of cooperation allow us to recognize that ownership of non-
personal property is objectively less important than enjoyment of our two moral powers and 
social and natural goods. The ownership of private property is not basic because it is unfair to 
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make people subordinate their conscience to an institution of lesser importance. It is only 
possible that people can cooperate as free and equal citizens when justice takes precedence in the 




Holt, J. (2017), The Requirements of Justice and Liberal Socialism, in: Analyse & Kritik 39, 
171–194 
 
Mill, J.S. (1997), The Subjection of Women, Mineola/NY 
 
Narveson, J. (2017), ‘Property-Owning Democracy’? ‘Liberal Socialism’? Or Just Plain 
Capitalism?, in: Analyse & Kritik 39: 413-416 
 
Rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice, revised edition, Cambridge/MA 
 
— (2001), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, E. Kelly (ed.), Cambridge/MA 
 
Taylor, R. S. (2014), Illiberal Socialism, in: Social Theory and Practice 40, 433–460 
 
Thomas, A. (2017), The Demands of Democratic Ownership, in: Analyse & Kritik 39: 413-416 
 
Von Platz, J. (2017), Democratic Rights and the Choice of Economic Systems, in: Analyse & 
Kritik 39: 405-412 
